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Abstract
We analyz e the determinants of participation ( whether to study)and schooling
( where and what to study)in a public system of higher education,based on a uniq ue
dataset of all eligible high school pupils in an essentially closed region ( Flanders) .We
nd that pupils perceiv e the av ailable institutions and programs as close substitutes,
implying an ambiguous role for trav el costs: they hardly a¤ect the participation de-
cisions,but hav e a strong impact on the schooling decisions.I n addition,high school
back ground plays an important role in both the participation and schooling decisions.
To illustrate how our empirical results can inform the debate on reforming public sys-
tems,we assess the e¤ects of tuition fee increases. Uniform cost- based tuition fee
increases achiev e most of the welfare gains;the additional gains from fee di¤erenti-
ation are relativ ely unimportant. These welfare gains are q uite large if one mak es
conserv ativ e assumptions on the social cost of public funds,and there is a substantial
redistribution from students to outsiders.
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11 Introduction
Public systems of higher education are experiencing increased challenges in many European
countries. The demand for higher education has more than doubled over the past thirty years.
Public spending increased at the same rate, because governments maintained a policy of very
low tuition fees and high subsidies per student. At the same time, there is little evidence that
the public systems performed signicantly better than the more market oriented systems in
the Anglo-Saxon countries. If anything, the gap appears to be widening. According to the
E.P.I. (Usher et al. (2005)), the countries with low private contributions are also often
the countries with low student participation rates, and vice versa.1 In terms of research
performance, most top universities come from the Anglo-Saxon countries. J acobs and van
der Ploeg (2005) compare the relative performance of both systems in more detail. There
is an increasing awareness that the public systems should incorporate more market-oriented
principles, whether through centralized regulatory or more drastic decentralized reforms.
The U.K. is a notable example of this evolution: tuition fees have recently increased rather
drastically, accompanied with the introduction of income-contingent student loans in line
with reform proposals by Barr (2004 ) and others.
Against this background we analyze the participation and schooling decisions in a public
system of higher education. The participation decision is the decision whether to start with
a higher education. The schooling decision is the decision where to study (which college
or university) and what to study (which program). We consider the role of the pupils
travel costs, their high school background and demographics, based on a unique data set
of all eligible high school pupils in the entire and essentially closed region of Flanders.2 A
key feature of our data set is the information on the pupilslocations, from which it is
possible to compute the travel costs to all educational study options. Another key feature
is the information on the educational choices at the highly disaggregate level of the study
program.
One of our central ndings is that pupils perceive the higher education institutions and
programs as close substitutes. This implies an ambiguous role for travel costs: college prox-
imity hardly in uences the pupils participation decisions, but it has a strong impact on their
schooling decisions. Put di¤erently, pupils are highly cost elastic for the decision where and
what to study, but not for the decision whether to study. In addition, we nd that the high
school background plays an important role in both the participation and schooling decisions.
1The E.P.I. points out two exceptions, Finland and the Netherlands, where private contributions are
among the lowest and overall participation in higher education among the highest.
2Flanders is the Northern part of Belgium, where Dutch is spoken. While access is open, in practice the
undergraduate system has been quite closed from the French-speaking part and from other countries.
2For example, pupils with a general high school background have an additional willingness to
pay (in terms of travel costs) for a university than a college education of more than e 4000,
compared with pupils of technical or professional high school backgrounds.
We use our empirical results to draw implications for reforming public systems of higher
education. Many issues have occupied the current debate, including the e¤ects of raising
tuition fees, rationalizing supply, and moving from input-based to output-based subsidies.
We focus on the e¤ects of raising tuition fees, which have been uniform at very low levels in
most European countries, including Flanders.3 Our estimated cost elasticities imply that a
uniform fee increase only has a small impact on overall participation, though comparatively
more on pupils from the technical and professional high school backgrounds. Di¤erentiated
fee increases also have a low overall e¤ect on participation but they imply large substitution
e¤ects (colleges versus universities; di¤erent study elds).
Our estimated welfare e¤ects of tuition fee reform can be summarized as follows. (1)
Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of the attainable total welfare gains.
The additional gains from fee di¤erentiation by program type or program eld (as opposed
to uniform fee increases) are relatively unimportant. (2) The welfare gains are quite large if
one makes conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds. (3) If one ignores the
social cost of public funds, the welfare gains from fee increases are small, but there is still a
substantial redistribution from students to outsiders. The overall conclusion is that uniform
fee increases achieve most of the total welfare gains, as well as a fairer distribution between
students and outsiders (if properly accompanied with student loans).
Previous empirical research has focused on the e¤ects of tuition fees on overall partici-
pation in higher education. These studies typically focus on the U.S. where it is possible to
exploit variation in tuition fees at the state level. Estimates on the participation e¤ects of an
increase in fees by $1,000 are in the range of 3 8 %; see Kane (19 9 5), Dynarski (2003) and
Cameron and Heckman (2001). We nd a considerably lower participation e¤ect of about
1%, which is perhaps not surprising since the current level of fees is low in the public system
we consider.
Only a few number of studies have looked at the e¤ects of tuition fees at the level of the
institution, though not at the more detailed level of the program eld. Most closely related
to our work is Long (2004), who conducted a comprehensive study on the role of tuition fees
3To identify the e¤ects of tuition fees, we assume that pupils respond in the same way to tuition fees as
to mobility or other monetary costs. This is a realistic assumption to the extent that capital constraints
do not become more binding after tuition cost increases. We therefore assume that tuition fee increases
can be accompanied with income-contingent loans, i.e. loans that can be paid back later depending on the
realization of income.
3and travel costs at the level the institution.4 She rst estimates a conditional logit model
for the schooling decision (where to study) and subsequently a binary logit model for the
participation decision. She nds that tuition fees have a higher impact on the schooling than
on the participation decision. We extend Longs model in several respects. First, we consider
the participation and schooling decisions in an integrated nested logit framework. This
approach allows us to infer the impact of tuition fees on both participation and schooling
from variation in travel costs among pupils (in the absence of tuition fee variation in a public
system).5 Second, we consider the schooling decision at the even more disaggregate level of
both the institution and the program eld. Finally, we conduct a total welfare analysis on
the e¤ects of uniform and di¤erentiated tuition fee increases, an issue that is perhaps of
stronger relevance in the European public systems than in the more market-oriented U.S.
system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some
key features of the higher education system in Flanders in 2001. This is representative for
several other public systems of higher education, and it introduces our subsequent questions.
In section 3 we introduce the empirical model of educational choice, and our estimation
approach to handle the very large data set. The fourth section discusses the empirical results.
We compare the estimates from our disaggregate nested logit model (at the level of the
institution and study program) with those of aggregate logit and nested logit models. We
also compute the estimated cost elasticities at various levels (total market level, colleges
versus universities, and the four main program elds). Finally, we estimate the welfare
e¤ects of uniform and di¤erentiated fee increases. Section 5 concludes.
2 The market for higher education in Flanders
We begin with a description of the relevant supply and demand characteristics of this market,
which is representative for many other public systems of higher education. Our description
applies to the year of our data set, 2001-2002.
4Several previous studies incorporated distance to college to explain the participation decision, see e.g.
Rouse (1995) or Frenette (2003). However, with the exception of Long (2004) these studies are not at the level
of the institution, so that distance is usually proxied by the distance to the most nearby college, regardless
of whether that college is chosen.
5We are able to compute the distance and travel costs of each pupil to each alternative based on infor-
mation of the pupils home address postal code, whereas Long (2004) only observes the pupils high school
address postal code.
42.1 Supply of higher education
Institutions and programs
There are two types of higher education institutions in Flanders: colleges and universities.
The colleges focus exclusively on teaching and o¤er vocational study programs, which are
oriented to professional training. Universities are also active in research, and they o¤er
academic study programs. Both colleges and universities either have a catholic or a non-
catholic orientation. They sometimes have multiple campuses, especially the colleges.
The vocational programs o¤ered at the colleges are either short programs (one cycle of
3 years), or long programs (two cycles comprising a total of 4 or 5 years). The academic
programs at universities are always long programs (two cycles).6 The programs can be
divided into four elds: arts, social sciences, biomedical sciences, and exact sciences. Each
eld consists of several elemental study options, e.g. nursing (a vocational program in
biomedical sciences) or civil engineering (an academic program in exact sciences).
Table 1 provides an overview of the supply of higher education in the year 2001-2002. The
top panel shows the number of campuses, broken down by type of institution and program
eld. The total number of campuses is 53, the majority being college campuses (44 versus
9 university campuses). Colleges more often have a catholic a¢liation, whereas universities
more often have a non-catholic a¢liation. Colleges show a higher degree of specialization,
since they typically do not o¤er all program elds. For example, only 12 out of the 44 college
campuses o¤er arts. Universities tend to be less specialized. All non-catholic universities o¤er
programs in biomedical and exact sciences, and all catholic universities o¤er programs in arts
and social sciences.
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the corresponding student numbers. The number of
students is higher at colleges than at universities (25,182 versus 12,299). But the number of
college campuses is comparatively even higher, so that the average scale at college campuses
is generally lower than at university campuses. It is also evident that most students choose
programs in social sciences, especially at the colleges, followed by programs in the exact
sciences.
To give an idea of the geographic coverage of higher education supply across the region
6In recent years, the long vocational programs at colleges have shown a trend towards convergence to
their academic counterparts at the universities (e.g. the economics or the engineering programs). This
development has in part been stimulated by the government. Already in 1991, a Decree stipulated the same
rules for two-cycle vocational programs at colleges as for academic programs at universities. Colleges o¤ering
two-cycle programs also became entitled to do applied research by means of co-operation agreements with
universities. More recently, the Bologna Declaration leading to the BachelorMaster reforms has strengthened
these developments.
5of Flanders, Figure 1 shows the locations of the campuses on a map. The upper map refers
to the universities, the lower one to the colleges. Focus only on the circle areas for now.
Each circle refers to a di¤erent campus, and is proportional to the number of rst-year
students. The gure shows that there is broad geographic coverage of higher education, with
the exception of the  cornersin the West and in the East. However, this broad coverage is
entirely due to the colleges. University coverage is concentrated around two main university
cities (Ghent and Leuven).
The role of the government
As in most other European countries the undergraduate system of higher education in
Flanders is entirely public. We only provide a very stylized overview here. Van He¤en and
Lubs (2003) country report provides a more detailed description.7
Both universities and colleges receive subsidies for teaching; universities in addition re-
ceive subsidies for research. The subsidies for teaching consist of a xed and a variable
component. The variable subsidies di¤er across the various study programs to account for
di¤erences in the variable cost per student. According to CHEPS (Deen et al. (2005)), the
cost per student tends to be lower for classroom-based programs (arts and social sciences)
than for laboratory-based programs (biomedical and exact sciences). To account for this, the
Flemish government has traditionally maintained a relatively simple system of four subsidy
categories at colleges and three categories at universities. It has recently proposed to revise
the rates to distinguish between additional categories, in line with the practices in seven
benchmark countries.8 Table 2 shows the (student-weighted) average variable subsidies per
student, for the four program elds at colleges and universities. The rst panel shows the
averages using the current subsidy rates, the second using the proposed revised rates. The
table shows that the subsidies, and hence the estimated variable costs per student, are lower
in arts and social sciences than in biomedical sciences and exact sciences. They also tend to
be lower at colleges than at universities. The proposed revised rates show a larger variation,
especially across the di¤erent program elds.
7For shorter descriptions covering a large set of countries including the region of Flanders, we refer to
Maassen (2000) or Eurydice (2000).
8These revisions t in a larger policy reform proposal in 2005, which aims to transform the input-based
subsidy system (based on the number of incoming students) to an output-based system (based on the
number of outcoming students). To prepare these reforms, the input-based subsidies were frozen in 2000
and should become output-based in 2007. This development is not relevant for our purposes here; we are
mainly interested in describing the variable subsidies as our proxy for how the goverment perceives the cost
per student.
For a detailed description of the current (frozen) subsidy rates, see van He¤en and Lub (2003), and of the
proposed revised rates, see Vandenbroucke (2005).
6The variable subsidies are only part of the governments rst ow budget on higher
education.9 According to Cantillon et al. (2005), the total budget is about e 8600 per
student, so that the variable part only accounts for about 38 percent of public spending. The
remaining part is independent of the number of students and can be viewed as a measure of
the xed costs to be covered.
In addition to the subsidies, the government intervenes in the tuition fees that the colleges
and universities are allowed to set. While the government gives some discretion, the tuition
fees show hardly any variation in practice. During the year of our study, 2001, the tuition
fees were essentially uniform at e 425 for colleges and e 445 for universities. This shows that
private contributions are extremely low, only about 5% of public higher education spending
(excluding research).
The policy of high subsidies and low tuition fees may have adverse e¤ects on both the
diversity and the quality of the supply. First, colleges and universities may have incentives
to o¤er too much diversity. The government therefore regulates the supply of programs.
There is an o¢cial list of subsidizable programs, but not all institutions necessarily receive
the authorization to o¤er all programs. The result is a specialization, which we illustrated
earlier in Table 1. Second, the institutions may have limited incentives to provide su¢cient
quality. A system of quality assurance aims to provide su¢cient incentives, through self-
assessment and external visiting committees. In principle, the government can take away the
authorization to o¤er a study program if quality is insu¢cient, though this rarely happens
in practice.
2.2 Demand for higher education  summary statistics
We now discuss the demand for higher education. This also introduces our data set and
subsequent econometric analysis of educational choice.
Every pupil with a high school degree is eligible to start with higher education. This is
true regardless of the type of high school degree that has been obtained. There are three
main types of high school degrees. A general high school degree provides a broad theoretical
training as a basis to continue with higher education. A technical high school degree puts
more emphasis on specialized technical-theoretic training but at the same time aims to
provide a su¢ciently general background to prepare for higher education. A professional
high school degree focuses mostly on practical training. Pupils with a professional high
school degree can still start with higher education provided that they have taken additional
9The rst ow budget is the part of the budget that directly goes to teaching. The second ow and third
ow budget are devoted to research.
7courses during a seventh year of study.10 In contrast with many other countries, there is no
direct rationing of participation in higher education, whether through numerus clausus or
through minimum course requirements or grades obtained during high school.11 Each pupil
who nishes high school is therefore in the position to make both the participation decision
(whether to study) and the schooling decision (where and what to study) by selecting one
option out of the full set of all available study alternatives.
To analyze this educational choice process, we combined two basic data sets, covering
essentially the entire population of eligible pupils: a pupils data set of all 55,905 last year
high school pupils in the year 2001; and a students data set of the 37,481 participating
students.12 For each pupil we observe sex, nationality, age, the high school institution, the
high school degree (program), and the home address. The Appendix provides more detailed
information on the two basic data sets, as well as on some additional auxiliary data sets,
and how we combined them.
We constructed a number of relevant variables describing the pupils prole, and we orga-
nize them in three groups. The rst group consists of general demographics: sex, nationality
and the religious a¢liation of the high school. The second group contains the scholastic
ability variables: years of repetition, the type of high school and the study program followed
at high school. Years of repetition is the age minus 18, and measures the number of failures
during high school. The type of high school (general, technical or professional) measures
the intellectual background, as we discussed above. The study programs at high school of-
fer additional information on ability and intellectual interests. For general high school, we
distinguish among the following elds: classical languages, modern languages, economics,
sciences and mathematics. These can be combined so they are not mutually exclusive. The
brightest pupils often follow either classical languages or mathematics (or both). In technical
high schools, there is a very large number of programs. For simplicity, we only distinguish
between programs that are people oriented (e.g. beautician, interior design) and programs
that are product oriented (e.g. car mechanics, construction techniques). There is also
10There is also a fourth high school category, arts. This also o¤ers a quite practical training. We do not
exclude them from our analysis, but since there are relatively few pupils here we include them in our base
category.
11During the year of our study, some programs (e.g. engineering and medicine) indirectly limited the
number of students through an entry examination. This does not function however as a mechanism to
directly limit the number of students per year.
12These are the pupils who either enroll immediately after highschool in 2001 (36,111 students) or with
one period of delay (1,370 students). Hence, the total participation rate of eligible pupils is 67%. Note that
the actual participation rate in higher education is lower since only 79% obtain of the people obtain a high
school degree.
8a large number of programs in professional high schools, but since there are relatively few
pupils graduating from professional schools (and even fewer that start with higher education)
we do not distinguish explicitly between programs for this category.
The third group of variables refers to transportation costs: distance travelled to the
campus (in km), and time travelled either by road or by train (in min). Time travelled by
road is the fastest calculated route from the pupils home postal code to her chosen campus
postal code. Time by train is equal to the travel time by road to the nearest well-connected
train station, plus the travel time on the train, plus a xed 10 minutes to incorporate the
time to get from the destination station to the campus. Based on these variables, we also
constructed an annual commuting cost variable in monetary terms, for a student making 300
trips per year at a cost of e 0.25 per km and an opportunity cost of time of e 8 per hour13.
This variable will enter our empirical model and it is further motivated at that point.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics: means for all the dummy variables (interpreted
as fractions of the population), and means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the
continuous variables. The rst column shows the unconditional statistics, i.e. for all pupils.
The remaining columns show the statistics conditional on the chosen alternative.
Demographics Slightly fewer males than females graduated from a high school in
2001 (48%), and they are comparatively less likely to participate in higher education (45%).
More surprisingly, male pupils are less represented in catholic institutions. This may be
due to preferences, or to the di¤erent supply o¤ered at catholic institutions; our subsequent
empiral model distinguishes between these possibilities by accounting for the combined choice
of institution and program elds. Similarly, pupils with a foreign nationality are less likely
to participate (2% of the pupils is foreign, but only 1% of the students), and those who do
participate are less represented at catholic institutions.
The majority of the pupils (75%) attended a catholic high school, and they are more likely
to participate (78% of the students). Furthermore, students from a catholic high school are
much more likely to choose a catholic institution (87% of the students at catholic institutions
have a catholic high school background, compared to 75% in general). This suggests there
are still strong links between the catholic high schools and the higher education institutions.
13The kilometre cost is a commonly used measure of distance cost for tax purposes (Belgisch Staatsblad
(2006)). The opportunity cost of time is representative for the hourly wage of student jobs (Jobdienst KU
Leuven (2006)).
9Ability The average years of repetitions is 0.6 (with a large standard deviation of 1.06),
but it is much lower for participating students (0.36) than for outsiders (1.11).14 Among the
students, the average years of repetition is especially small for students going to universities
rather than colleges (0.16 versus 0.48).
Up to 48% of the pupils come from a general high school, slightly more than one third
from a technical high school, and only 17% from a professional high school.15 Pupils from a
general high school are more likely to participate (they make up 60% of the students, and
only 48% of the pupils). Pupils with a technical high school background are more or less
proportionally represented in higher education, but they mainly participate at colleges, and
only form a small minority at universities. Pupils from a professional high school (the base)
are least represented.
Pupils with a general high school background in mathematics or classical languages have
a particularly strong propensity to go to universities rather than to colleges or staying out.
Pupils from a people oriented technical high school have a strong presence at colleges (over
one third).
M obility Distance travelled is on average 35 kilometers, with a large standard devi-
ation. Car and train travel time are on average 31 minutes and 48 minutes. The average
annual commuting costs (including transportation and time costs) is e 3,800. The average
travel distance is higher for students going to universities than for students going to colleges
(42 versus 31 km), reecting the lower geographic coverage of universities as shown earlier
on the map in gure 1. The rather high standard deviations show there is a lot of variation
in distance travelled across students.
Our earlier Figure 1 provides additional information on the role of proximity to insti-
tutions in explaining participation. The di¤erent shadings shows the di¤erent participation
rates throughout the region. Part (a) suggests that the university participation rates are
related to proximity: high participation rates (above 25%) are especially found around the
two main universities, whereas low participation rates (below 15%) occur in the West and
East corners of the region. Part (b) also suggests that the college participation rates vary
across the region according to college proximity. Nevertheless, the pattern is less pronounced,
probably due to the high geographic coverage throughout the region. Note that the areas
with little university participation are often areas with a high college participation (see for
14As mentioned earlier, for the pupils of a professional highschool, there is one additional preparatory year
before becoming eligible to higher education. We include this in our denition of repetitions.
15The total fraction of pupils in a professional highschools is much larger than 17%. However, a substantial
number does not complete their degree, and we are looking here at last year pupils only.
10example the low university and the high college participation in the West). This suggests
that proximity may not matter that much for the decision whether to study as for the deci-
sion where to study. Whether this is indeed the case, will be addressed in our econometric
model.
These summary statistics provide some preliminary suggestive ndings on the role of
demographics, ability and mobility in participation and schooling decisions. We are now
ready to discuss how our econometric framework takes these characteristics into account.
3 Empirical framework
We now specify the empirical model of the pupils participation and schooling decisions, i.e.
their decisions whether to start with higher education studies, and, if so, where and what to
study. We model their decision in a discrete choice framework in which individuals choose
the alternative that maximizes random utility among the set of available alternatives. We
adopt a version of the nested logit model (McFadden (1978)). This model is well suited to
deal in a reasonably exible way with the very large size of our data set: 55;9 0 5 pupils,
56 3choice alternatives, and a large set of observed variables describing pupils and choice
alternatives. In particular, the model allows for consistent estimation with a large set of
choice alternatives, by explicitly aggregating and/or sampling over the alternatives. At the
same time, the model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity since individuals may have
correlated preferences across alternatives belonging to the same nest. More general models
of unobserved heterogeneity, such as mixed or random coe¢cient logit models (McFadden
and Train (2000)) inhibit sampling over alternatives and are therefore not feasible given the
size of our choice set. Since we capture a lot of observed individual characteristics anyway, the
need for more general models of unobserved heterogeneity is less than in other applications.
3.1 The choice model
Each individual i chooses one out of a large set of choice alternatives. The individuals are
the pupils who have nished high school and who are therefore eligible to start with higher
education studies. The choice alternatives are dened by the institution (the university or
college) and the actual program (e.g. nursing, civil engineering, etc.) There is also one no-
study alternative. The total number of choice alternatives is very large (56 3 , including the
no-study alternative), and it is typically not feasible to systematically incorporate observable
choice-specic variables at this level of detail. Our framework therefore explicitly deals with
the possibility of aggregation and sampling over alternatives.
11There are J study options, j = 1J. For each study option j there are Kj variants
or elemental alternatives, k = 1Kj. Alternative 0 is the no-study option. The total
number of alternatives is
PJ
j=1 Kj + 1 = 563. The empirical analysis aggregates the Kj
variants to the level of the study option j. For example, the study option may be dened at
the level of the institution, or at the level of the institution, program type (short vocational,
long vocational or academic) and program eld (arts, social sciences, biomedical sciences or
exact sciences). In both cases, the variants per study option are dened accordingly, i.e. as
the actual programs o¤ered under the dened study option. Note that this framework also
covers the general case of no aggregation: simply dene the study options as the institution
and the actual program. Each study option then goes with a single variant, so that Kj = 1
for all j.
An individual is utility for study option j and variant k, Uijk, is the sum of a deterministic
component Vijk and a random component "ijk, i.e. Uijk = Vijk+"ijk. Assume that there is no
choice-specic information at the level of the variant k. Hence, the deterministic component
of utility is the same for each variant k of study option j, Vijk = Vij for all k. Individual is
utility for study option j and variant k is then given by:
Uijk = Vij + "ijk:
Individual is utility for the no-study option is:
Ui0 = Vi0 + "i0:
The random component of utility follows the distributional assumptions of a three-level
nested logit model (McFadden (1978)). At the highest level, there are two nests: the study
nest S, which includes the study options and their variants; and the no-study nest, which is
a degenerate nest with only alternative 0. At the lower level, the study nest S consists of
the J di¤erent study option nests, j = 1J. At the lowest level, each study option nest j
consists of the Kj variants. The distribution of the "ijkand "i0 has a sequential structure with
two parameters,  and . The parameter  roughly measures the extent to which the "ijk
show correlation between the J study option nests within the study nest S (i.e. correlation
relative to the no-study option 0). Similarly, the parameter  measures the extent to which
the "ijk show additional correlation across the Kj variants within a given study option nest
j.16 A parameter close to zero means that the correlation is weak, while a parameter close
to one means that the correlation is strong. To illustrate, if  =  = 0 the model reduces to
16There is no parameter for the no-study nest, since it is a degenerate nest. Furthermore, we assume that
the parameter  is common for all J study option nests. It would be straightforward to allow this parameter
to vary across the study option nests, e.g. according to the institution or program type or program eld.
12a simple logit model with no correlation between the "ijk. As another example, if  = 0 and
 = 1, then there is no correlation of the "ijk between the study option nests, while there is
perfect correlation between the variants within each study option nest.
Individuals choose the alternative that maximizes random utility Uijk. The nested logit
model is consistent with random utility maximization if 0      1 (McFadden (1978)),
i.e. correlation parameters are between zero and one, with a weaker correlation between
than within the study option nests. Because the distribution of the "ijk and "i0 has a
sequential structure, the nested logit model yields simple expressions for the conditional
choice probabilities: the probability of choosing a variant k within a study option nest Pijkjj,
the probability of choosing a study option j within the study nest PijjS, and the probability of
choosing the study nest PiS. We are not interested in the probability that individual i chooses
variant k of study option j, i.e. Pijk = PijkjjPijjSPiS, since there is no choice-specic variation
at the level of the variant k, Vijk = Vij. Our interest is thus only in the aggregate probability
that individual i chooses any variant of study option j, i.e. Pij = PijjSPiS. Applying the
formulas for the three-level nested logit model, the probability Pij for j = 1J is:
Pij =
PKj
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Since the variants k within study option nest j have the same utility, Vijk = Vij for all k,
this can be simplied to:
Pij =
e x p ( V 
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; (1)
where V 
ij = Vij+( 1 )l n ( Kj) can be interpreted as the aggregate utility of a study option j.
This shows that we can consider a simplied two-level nested logit model at the level of the
study option j, after simply including l n ( Kj) as a correction term to Vij; see also Ben-Akiva
and Lerman (1985). The correction term captures the extent of unobserved heterogeneity
within a study option. It drops out if ( 1   ) is equal to zero: the utilities of the variants of
the same study option are perfectly correlated (homogeneous), so that additional variants
do not lead to a higher aggregate utility of that study option. Note that the correction term
also drops out in the general case of no aggregation, since in this case Kj = 1 for all j.
The probability that i chooses the no-study option Pi0 is simply:
13Pi0 = 1   PiS =
exp(Vi0)
PJ




It is instructive to compare this model to Long (2004), who has been the only author to
consider the study options at the level of the individual institution. First, she does not include
a correction term (1 )ln(Kj) to the utility terms of the study options. This is a special case
of our model if  = 1, i.e. homogeneity of the variants within the institution. Second, Long
estimates her model sequentially. In a rst step, she models the probability where to study,
conditional on choosing to study, i.e. Pij= S in our notation. In a second step, she models
the probability whether or not to study, i.e. PiS and Pi0, using the characteristics of the
predicted most preferred alternative as explanatory variables in the deterministic component
of utility. This may also be viewed as a special case of our model for  = 1. Indeed, as 





= ma x(V 
i1 V 
iJ), so that PiS, as
given by the second part of (1), reduces to Longs binary choice model.17
3.2 Indirect utility
We specify the deterministic component of utility Vij of individual i for alternative j as a
conditional indirect utility function. It depends on the expected benets, including mon-
etary returns in the form of increased future salaries, and on the expected costs, i.e. the
non-monetary costs of studying and the monetary costs in the form of tuition fees and travel
costs. In our application, tuition fees are low and do not show any variation across al-
ternatives. However, individuals pay an implicit price in the form of travel or commuting
costs: transportation costs and the opportunity cost of time. We consider the following
specication of Vij:
Vij = j + w
0
i
j + i(yi   tj   g(xij)); (3)
where wi is a vector of individual characteristics (sex, age, high school background, etc.), yi
is individual i s annual income, tj is the tuition fee for study option j (currently uniform
at about e 500 for all j 6= 0, but possibly di¤erentiated across study options after policy
reform), and g(xij) is the implicit price paid by individual i for alternative j, which is a
function of the annual travel or commuting costs xij.
In principle, one may include a full set of alternative-specic intercepts j and alternative-
specic slope vectors 
j (relative to one base alternative). For example, women may have a
17This comparison is not entirely accurate. Longs specication includes variables such as distance in both
steps of the estimation. For her approach to be exactly a special case of our random utility framework, the
coe¢cients of these common variables should have been restricted to be the same.
14di¤erent valuation for every alternative than men. In practice, such exibility would imply
a very large number of parameters to be estimated, since the set of alternatives is large,
and there are many individual characteristics in the vector wi. To reduce the number of
parameters, we will summarize the alternative-specic e¤ects j and 
j by a more limited
set of characteristics, i.e. the institutions religious orientation, the program type and the
program eld. A more precise discussion of the included variables is given in the next section.
The second part of (3) refers to the utility derived from the consumption on other goods
(i.e. other than the educational choice), after spending an implicit price g(xij), which is an
increasing function of the annual commuting costs xij. The parameter i can be interpreted
as the marginal utility of income of individual i. It can be used to quickly reinterpret the
other parameters such as the 
j in (3) in monetary terms (by simply dividing 
j by i), and
to conduct a more complete welfare analysis.
The annual commuting costs xij of individual i for alternative j consist of two compo-
nents: transportation costs and the opportunity cost of time (McFadden and Train (1978)).
The transportation costs (in Euro) are proportional to the distance per trip dij (in km).
The opportunity cost of time (also in Euro) is proportional to the travel time per trip tij
(in min). More precisely, specify the annual commuting costs as xij = 7 5dij + 4 0tij.18 Each
individual has two options: commute or go on residence. If she commutes, her implicit price
for alternative j is simply g(xij) = xij. If she goes on residence, she saves a fraction  of
the trips, but pays an extra annual cost on rent rj. Her implicit price is correspondingly
g(xij) = (1   )xij + rj. A cost-minimizing individual commutes if xij  rj, and goes on
residence otherwise. Intuitively, commuting is preferred if the annual commuting costs are
su¢ciently small relative to the annual cost of rent. The deterministic component of utility
(3) for a cost-minimizing individual can then be written as:
Vij = j + w
0
i
j + i (yi   tj   xij) + i(xij   rj)I(xij   rj); (4)
where I() is an indicator function equal to 1 if the expression inside the brackets is positive,
and equal to 0 otherwise. Utility thus decreases in the commuting costs xij in a piecewise
linear way: at a steeper rate i for low values of xij (when the pupil commutes), and at a
atter rate i for high values of xij (when the pupil goes on residence).
The utility specication (4) holds for the J study options, j = 1J, as well as for the
no-study option 0. For the study options, xij has the clear interpretation of the commuting
18This assumes that a commuter engages in 10 trips per week during 30 weeks of the year, at a trans-
portation cost of 0.25 Euro/km and an opportunity cost of time of 8 Euro/hour. The annual transportation
cost per kilometer (in Euro) is then 10  3 0  0:2 5= 7 5 , and the annual opportunity cost of time per minute
(in Euro) is 10  3 0  ( 8 =6 0)= 4 0.
15costs of individual i to study option j. This may clearly vary across individuals and study
options. For the no-study option, xi0 can be interpreted as the commuting costs to work. We
assume this to be constant across individuals, xi0 = x0, and to be su¢ciently small so that
the last term does not enter in Vi0.19
It is again instructive to compare this specication to Long (2004). She allows utility to
vary quadratically with distance, and nds that utility decreases with distance at a decreasing
rate. Our commuter/resident specication yields the same degree of exibility. In fact, a
specication of Vij that is quadratic in xij indeed gave a similar t. The advantage of our
approach in this context is that the coe¢cient of xij, i.e. i, can also be interpreted as the
marginal utility of income. In Longs specication, the price (i.e. tuition fee) coe¢cient can
be directly interpreted as the marginal utility of income, but this coe¢cient is not identied
here since tuition fees show no variation across alternatives. In sum, our specication allows
us to capture the role of distance in the same exible way as Longs, while at the same time
providing us a marginal utility of income coe¢cient in the absence of any variation of a
direct measure of price.
3.3 Estimation
The choice probabilities (1) and (2) may be used to construct the likelihood function and
estimate the model. There are, however, practical di¢culties due to the size of our data set.
 There is a very large number of individuals (55;905).
 Each individual can choose from a very large number of alternatives (563, including
the no-study alternative).
 The associated choice-specic variables need to be interacted with many individual
characteristics (the demographic and high school background variables).
There are several ways to reduce the size of the data set: aggregation over alternatives,
sampling over alternatives, and sampling over individuals. We adopt a combination of these
approaches.
First, we aggregate over alternatives. Using the framework in section 3.1, we aggregate
the variants k to the level of the study option j by adding the correction term (1 )ln(Kj)
to Vij. We consider two denitions of the study option j. Our aggregate model denes
the study options as the 53 di¤erent institutions. This model serves as a useful benchmark
since it considers the same aggregation level as in Long (2004). It discards, however, almost
19The exact value of x0 is irrelevant and can be normalized since it is not separately identied from 0.
16all of the information on the study programs (except for including the correction term for
the number of programs o¤ered at the institution ln(Kj)). Since this is a main source of
richness of our data, which we want to exploit in our empirical analysis, we will focus on a
disaggregate model. This model denes the study options as the 154 di¤erent institutions,
program types, and program elds (though it still aggregates over the actual programs within
a eld, e.g. nursing which is one of the vocational social sciences programs). Utility Vij can
then be specied to depend on both the institutions characteristics and on the program
characteristics down to the level of the program eld.
Second, we sample over alternatives; this is only necessary to estimate our disaggregate
model. In simple logit models one can randomly select a reduced choice set for each in-
dividual, and dene the choice probabilities as if the individuals only faced this reduced
choice set. Maximum likelihood estimation based on these as-if choice probabilities yields
consistent estimates (McFadden (1978)). We extend this approach to the nested logit model
by exploiting its sequential structure. We rst consider the probability of choosing a study
option j, conditional on choosing to study, i.e. PijjS entering as the rst term in (1). This
is a simple logit probability, so that it is possible to sample over alternatives and obtain
consistent estimates. More precisely, for each student we construct a reduced choice set of
2 0 study options, i.e. the chosen study option and a random sample of 19 other study op-
tions. This gives consistent estimates for the parameters entering the study option utilities
Vij. We subsequently consider the probability whether to study, i.e. PijS entering as the
second term in (1). Provided that the utilities of all the study options are now included, as
computed from the parameter estimates of the rst stage, this yields consistent estimates
of the parameters entering the no-study option Vi0 and of the distributional parameter .
Since this is a two-step estimation procedure, the standard formulas for the standard errors
of the parameters computed in the second step (i.e. those for the no-study option and )
are not correct. We follow the general procedure of Murphy and Topel (1985) to obtain the
corrected standard errors.
Finally, we sample over individuals. In general, there is a trade-o¤ between sampling over
alternatives and sampling over individuals (doubling the size of the sampled choice set implies
halving the number of individuals to keep the size of the data set xed). Our experience
showed that it is more e¢cient to sample over the alternatives than over the individuals, in
particular to identify the utility e¤ects of some relatively unpopular alternatives with few
observations. We therefore sampled much less heavily over individuals than over alternatives.
For both the aggregate and the disaggregate models we sampled about 2 0;000 out of the
55;905 individuals, as compared to a sampled choice set of 2 0 out of the 155 alternatives.
173.4 Alternative specications
We compare three di¤erent models.
 In the aggregate logit model the choice alternatives are at the level of the institution.
The choice set thus consists of 54 alternatives, i.e. 53 study options and one no-study
option.
 In the aggregate nested logit model the choice alternatives are again at the level of the
institution, but there is now a nesting parameter  that may be di¤erent from 0. This
allows for unobserved heterogeneity in that individuals may have correlated preferences
across the 53 study options, even after conditioning on the observable characteristics.
 In the disaggregate nested logit model the choice set consists of 155 alternatives (in-
cluding one no-study option), referring to the institutions, the program types (long
and short vocational, and academic) and the program elds (exact sciences, biomed-
ical sciences, social sciences and arts). There is again a nesting parameter  to allow
for correlated preferences across the 154 study options.
The rst two specications correspond to the previous literature, which also looked at
the participation and schooling decisions at the aggregate institution level. As mentioned
earlier, there are still two important di¤erences with the most comprehensive study to date,
i.e. Long (2004): the inclusion of the correction term ln(Kj) to account for the aggregation
over the di¤erent programs within each institution; and the integrated consideration of the
participation and schooling decisions. The third specication is at the more detailed level of
the institution and the program eld, which has not been considered in previous work. Since
this third specication is the most general, we will focus our discussion around it, and use
the results from the two aggregate models mainly as a point of comparison with previous
work.
It remains to specify the variables entering the indirect utility Vij as given by (4), i.e.
the individual characteristics entering wi and i, and the choice characteristics entering
j and 
j. The vector of individual characteristics wi includes the following 12 variables:
sex, nationality, years of repetition during high school (age   18), high schools religious
orientation (catholic or not), and 8 variables referring to the type of high school education
(i.e. various forms of general and technical high school, relative to a professional high school
education). Similarly, we specify the marginal utility of income or the commuting cost
parameter i to depend on the full vector of individual characteristics wi. Hence, i = w0
i,
where  is the corresponding vector of parameters.
18The number of alternative-specic intercepts j and slope vectors 
j is very large. In
particular, in the disaggregate model with 155 choice alternatives and 12 individual charac-
teristics in wi, there are up to 154 + 154  12 = 2002 parameters to be estimated. To make
estimation and interpretation feasible, we therefore put some structure on j and 
j. The
intercepts j are specied to depend on a full set of institution, program type and program
eld dummy variables. The slope 
l
j corresponding to each individuals characteristic l de-
pends on the following choice characteristics: a dummy variable for the no-study option (
l
0),
and a set of dummy variables characterizing the study options: the religious a¢liation of the
institution (catholic or not), the program type (short-term vocational, long-term vocational
or academic) and the program eld (exact sciences, biomedical sciences, social sciences, or
arts). We take the following study option as the base: a non-catholic institution o¤ering a
short-term vocational program in the eld of arts. Hence, all estimated slopes 
l
j should be
estimated relative to that base.20
Descriptive statistics on the individual characteristics entering wi and i, unconditional
and conditional on the chosen alternative, were presented and discussed earlier in Table 3.
4 Empirical results
We begin with a discussion of the parameter estimates, to uncover the determinants of the
participation and schooling decisions. Next, we summarize our key results through the cost
elasticities implied by our estimates. Finally, we draw some implications on the welfare
e¤ects of uniform and di¤erentiated tuition fee increases.
4.1 Parameter estimates
Tables 4 and 5 present the empirical results. Table 4 compares the estimates of several
parameters across the three di¤erent models (aggregate logit, aggregate nested logit, and
disaggregate nested logit): the nesting parameters  and , the slope parameters entering
the utility of the no-study option (
0) and the commuting cost parameters (). Table 5 shows
the slope parameters entering the utility of the study options (
j, j 6= 0). This table only
20In the two aggregate models with 54 alternatives, the number of alternative-specic intercepts j and
the alternative-specic slopes 
j is lower, i.e. 53+ 5312 = 702, so that estimation of all parameters would
be easier. However, for ease of comparison and interpretation we adopt a more parsimonious specication
that is similar to the disaggregate model. The only di¤erence is that the j and 
j obviously no longer
include dummy variables referring to long-term vocational program type and to the program elds.
19shows the estimates for the disaggregate nested logit model, since there are many of these
parameters.21
We rst discuss the observed and unobserved determinants of participation (
0 and  in
Table 4). Next, we highlight the role of mobility costs in both participation and schooling (
in Table 4). Third, we discuss the determinants of schooling (
j, j 6= 0 in Table 5). Finally,
we briey discuss the aggregation parameter ( in Table 4).
Observed and unobserved determinants of participation (
0 and )
The top part of Table 4 shows how individuals di¤er in their valuation of the no-study
option. We focus our discussion on the estimates of the most general disaggregate nested
logit model (third column). Males and especially foreigners have a signicantly higher utility
from staying out of higher education. The same holds true for older pupils, i.e. those
who experienced repetitions during high school. Pupils from a catholic high school have a
signicantly lower utility from staying out than others. This is consistent with the reputation
of the catholic high schools in providing a strong preparation for a higher education.
The most important individual characteristics a¤ecting the participation decision relate
to the pupils type of high school. Pupils with a technical and especially those with a general
high school education have a substantially lower utility from staying out relative to the pupils
from a professional high school. This may be either due to the acquired or due to the intrinsic
skills of these pupils. So one should be cautious and not conclude that promoting general
high school education will improve participation in higher education. What matters for our
purposes, is only that the type of high school background does play an important role, which
will be reected in our estimated cost elasticities. Finally, while the type of high school plays
a crucial role, the specic discipline followed at the high school does not matter much in the
participation decision. None of the so-called more di¢cult general high school disciplines,
such as mathematics or classical languages, matter in the participation decision.
Most of the estimated 
0 are of a similar order magnitude in the more restrictive aggregate
models, but there are some important di¤erences. For example, the aggregate logit model
estimates pupils with a catholic high school background to have a higher utility from staying
out, in contrast with common wisdom. This illustrates the importance of accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity a¤ecting the participation decision, as captured by the nesting
parameter . While the logit model restricts  to be equal to zero, the nested logit model
estimates it as 0:9 and 0:95 in the aggregate and disaggregate versions. Hence, pupils have
21A comparison of the parameters in 
j across models does not yield any main additional insights. Many
of the parameters do not enter in the aggregate models, and the ones that do (relating to the institutions
religious a¢liation and program type) were usually estimated to be similar.
20strongly correlated preferences across all study options and view them as close substitutes
relative to the no-study option.22
In sum, while several observed individual characteristics a¤ect the utility of the no-study
option, there remains a lot of unobserved heterogeneity a¤ecting the participation decision.
The role of mobility costs in participation and schooling ()
The next question concerns the role of the annual commuting costs, a¤ecting the valu-
ations of the study options relative to the no-study option. Table 4 shows that the annual
commuting costs have a negative and highly signicant e¤ect on utility (an estimate of  6:46
and a t-statistic of  17:84 in the third specication). Furthermore, the parameter  = 0:49
shows that the e¤ect of commuting costs is not linear but decreasing. Students who live suf-
ciently far and go on residence save 49% on the commuting costs (to be traded o¤ against
their xed renting costs). The e¤ect of the commuting costs di¤ers across individuals in
some respects, for example pupils from a catholic high school are somewhat less cost sen-
sitive. Pupils from a technical high school with a social orientation appear to be more cost
sensitive than others. Overall, however, mobility costs do not show much signicant variation
across individuals.
Commuting costs thus have a highly signicant e¤ect, but do they play a quantitatively
important role in the pupils participation decision?Or are they more relevant for the school-
ing decision, i.e. the decision where and what to study? Since the commuting costs enter
the utility of the no-study option and the study options with a common parameter i, it
would appear that they may have a similar e¤ect on both the participation and the school-
ing decisions. However, this is only the case in the logit model. The nested logit models
showed that pupils value the various study options as close substitutes for each other, rel-
ative to the no-study option. Our estimate of  = 0:95 implies that pupils are actually up
to 1=(1   0:95) = 20 times more responsive to commuting costs in their schooling decision
than in their participation decision (see (1)). An increase in the mobility costs of one of the
study options would thus generate substantial shifts in demand to other study options. But
an increase in the mobility costs of the no-study option would have much smaller e¤ects. In
this sense, the pupils mobility is a relative matter. Most pupils choose a study option close
to their homes because they have a lot of study options in their neighborhood and they view
these as close substitutes to more distant alternatives. But those pupils who do not have
nearby access to any study option, would be willing to travel high amounts. These ndings
will be conrmed in our subsequent analysis, where we report the cost elasticities implied
22The parameter is signicantly di¤erent from one at the 5% level, so that perfect correlation can be
rejected.
21by our estimates.
Determinants of schooling (
j)
Table 5 shows how individuals di¤er in their valuations of the various study options. The
base study option is a non-catholic institution o¤ering a short-term vocational program, in
the eld of arts. To obtain an idea of the quantitative importance of the parameter estimates,
one may compute the additional willingness to pay relative to the base study option in
monetary terms (in e 10,000s), by simply dividing the coe¢cients by the marginal utility
of income i. Table 5 reveals several interesting ndings.
The rst column shows how individuals value catholic institutions of higher education.
Few variables play a role, but the one exception is the religious orientation of the pupils
former high school. The coe¢cient of 1:05 is highly signicant and it is also quantitatively
important. It amounts to an additional willingness to pay for a catholic institution by pupils
from a catholic high school of e 10,000  1.05 / (6.46-0.45) = e 1,750. This indicates that
there are still strong linkages between the religious networks.
The next two columns show the valuations for the program type, i.e. academic or long
term-term vocational programs (relative to short-term vocational). Interestingly, males and
foreigners have a higher valuation for academic or long-term vocational programs. Hence,
while they have a lower utility from participation (as we saw before), they do have a stronger
preference for the long-term programs conditional on participating. Pupils who experienced
years of repetition during high school have a lower utility from participating in the long-
term programs, whether vocational or academic. The type of high school plays a signicant
role: pupils with the intellectually more demanding general high school background are not
only more likely to participate, but they also choose the more demanding vocational long
and especially academic program types. Their additional willingness to pay for academic
programs at universities than for short-term vocational programs at colleges amounts to
e10,000  2.71 / (6.46-0.36) = e 4,440. Furthermore, while we earlier found that the specic
discipline taken at a general high school does not matter for participation, it does matter
for the type of higher education program. Pupils with a general high school background in
science, mathematics and classical languages have a substantially higher valuation for the
academic or long-term vocational programs than for the short-term programs. Most notably,
pupils who took classical languages would be willing to pay an additional e 10,000  1.88 /
(6.46-0.53) = e 3,170 to follow an academic rather than a short-term vocational program,
relative to comparable other general high school pupils.
The nal three columns show the valuations for the specic program elds. The type of
high school and the specic discipline followed at high school play the quantitatively most
22important roles. Generally speaking, pupils prefer the program elds that closely match
the discipline they followed at high school. For example, pupils who followed science or
mathematics at a general high school prefer sciences, whereas pupils who followed classi-
cal languages prefer arts. These ndings stress the central importance of the high school
background in the subsequent higher education decision, in contrast to some claims that the
general high school leaves the options open for all study options at the higher education
level.
It is interesting to point out that the gender e¤ect also comes out strong in explaining
di¤erences in valuations across the study elds. Females have a strong preference for arts and
especially biomedical sciences, and the weakest preference for exact sciences, as compared to
males. While this seems to simply conrm common wisdom, it is important to stress that
these gender e¤ects are found even after having controlled for gender di¤erences in the high
school education background. For example, females have a lower willingness to pay for exact
sciences than arts of e 2,400 relative to males, even if they both have the same science high
school background.
Aggregation ()
Finally, consider the aggregation parameter , which is interacted with the log of the
number of variants Kj available at aggregate study option j. It measures the degree to
which preferences are correlated across the Kj variants over which we aggregated. In the
two aggregate models,  < , which is inconsistent with the restrictions of the nested logit
model.23 In the third, disaggregate model,  = 0:955 > , but it is still quite close to .
This means that preferences only show weak additional correlation over the variants available
at each study option. This nding suggests the need for even more detailed disaggregate
analysis, to study educational choices at even more disaggregate levels. We leave this as a
topic for further research.
4.2 Cost elasticities
Many of our empirical ndings can be summarized by the own- and cross-cost elasticities of
demand. We focus on the semi-elasticities, dened as the percentage change in the number
of students in response to an absolute increase in the monetary costs xij of a given study
option or subset of study options. We consider here an absolute cost increase by e 1,000 (or
equivalently, given our denition of xij, an increase in the daily commuting distance by 9km
23T-statistics also showed that the di¤erence is signicant.
23for a pupil traveling at a speed of 60km/h).24
The estimated cost elasticities provide information as to how participation and schooling
would change in response to uniform or di¤erentiated tuition fee increases. They may also give
a rst impression on the possible e¤ects of a rationalization of supply, which is essentially
a very large cost increase for a subset of study options. Finally, the cost elasticities are
informative in interpreting the results of a more complete welfare analysis of reform.
We compute the cost elasticities at three di¤erent levels: the level of the market, the
program type (colleges versus universities), and the program elds.
Uniform cost increase
Table 6 considers the e¤ects of a uniform cost increase by e 1,000 on colleges (rst
column), universities (second column), and overall participation (third column). The rst
panel compares the elasticities as implied by the aggregate logit, the aggregate nested logit
and the disaggregate nested logit. The results di¤er dramatically. While the logit model
would predict overall participation to drop by a substantial 13:79%, the aggregate nested
logit model predicts a drop of only 1:62%, and the disaggregate nested logit model a drop
of an even lower 0:91%. These large di¤erences across models follow from our nding that
pupils have quite strongly correlated preferences across study options, i.e. they perceive the
various study options as close substitutes ( = 0:95). Hence, while mobility costs matter in
their schooling decisions, they play only a limited role in their participation decisions. In all
models the relative drop in students is larger at colleges than at universities, e.g.  1:09%
versus  0:51% in the disaggregate nested logit model; the absolute drop at colleges is even
higher since colleges have a larger market share.
The second panel shows how the elasticities di¤er among pupils. Males and foreign-
ers are more likely to drop out than others. For example, male students would drop their
overall participation by 1:07% compared to a drop of 0:78% for female students.25 Stu-
dents with no repetitions are less likely to drop out than students with one or two years
of repetition ( 0:65% versus  1:41% and  2:14%). The most important di¤erences are
found between students from di¤erent high school background: students with a general high
24More formally, denote the predicted probability that individual i chooses study option j by b Pij(xi),
where xi = (xi1 xiJ) is the J 1 vector of individual is monetary costs for the various study options. Let
 be a J1 vector of ones and zeros, where the ones denote the study options for which there is a cost increase
by e 1000: The semi-elasticity of demand for all study options j 2 A with respect to a cost increase 1000












j2A b Pij(xi). For example, suppose that the
set A consists of all study options and all elements in  are equal to 1. The semi-elasticity then refers to the
percentage change in the total number of students in response to a uniform cost increase by e 1000.
25The ratio of these changes is similar to the odds ratio, which is equal to e x p(
l
0) for the l-th individual
characteristic.
24school background would reduce participation by only 0:5%, whereas students from technical
and professional high schools would drop participation by, respectively, 1:35% and 2:58%.
In sum, the empirical results show that the overall demand for higher education is highly
inelastic, although there are some clear di¤erences between individuals.
Cost increases by program type: colleges versus universities
Additional insights are obtained by considering the cost elasticities at lower levels of
aggregation. Table 7 presents the semi-elasticities at the level of the program type: vocational
programs at colleges versus academic programs at universities. Cost increases by colleges
only or by universities only evidently have even smaller e¤ects on total participation (last
column). However, underlying these small total e¤ects, there are large shifts in demand. A
e 1,000 cost increase to all colleges reduces college demand by almost 13%, and a e 1,000
cost increase to all universities reduces university demand by an even larger 24%. These
ndings are consistent with our earlier discussion on the role of mobility costs. Since pupils
have strongly correlated preferences across study options, they are quite willing to substitute
between colleges and universities in response to a di¤erentiated cost increase, even though
they are unlikely to refrain from participation altogether.
We can use these results to assess the governments historic e¤orts to promote participa-
tion by investing in a large college network with a broad geographic coverage. Our estimated
cost elasticities suggest that these e¤orts only have a negligible e¤ect on total participation.
The investment e¤orts thus mainly lead to a substitution from universities to colleges. In
this sense, we may conclude that the governments policy has essentially not lead to more
democratization, but rather to a diversion away from universities. This relates to Rouses
(1995) ndings on the impact of U.S. community colleges on educational attainment. She
also found that colleges did not increase the likelihood of attendance (though they may have
led to an increase in the number of years of schooling). However, even if the promotion of
colleges did not have an e¤ect on democratization, this does not mean it is undesirable. The
diversion to colleges may be e¢cient or ine¢cient depending on the benets to pupils and
the di¤erent costs of supplying education at colleges and universities. We will turn to that
question in our welfare analysis below.
Cost increases by program eld
Cost elasticities at the lower level of the program eld provide interesting additional
information. For example, they are relevant in assessing regulatory policies to promote certain
study programs. They are also of interest in assessing the e¤ects of introducing di¤erentiated
tuition fees. To our knowledge, there are no previous estimates of elasticities in higher
education at the level of the program eld.
25Table 8 shows the estimated semi-elasticities for eight disciplines (arts, social sciences,
biomedical sciences, and exact sciences; of either the vocational or the academic type).
The own-cost elasticities on the diagonals show that pupils are quite cost-sensitive for all
disciplines. The elasticities tend to be lower for the disciplines with the higher market share.
For example, vocational biomedical sciences have by far the highest market share and also
the lowest own-cost elasticity. However, market share is not the only relevant factor. For
example, academic social sciences and vocational exact sciences have a similar market share,
but pupils are much more cost sensitive towards the former.
The cross-cost elasticities reveal several additional interesting patterns. It is best to read
the cross-elasticities by row. Notice rst that the cross-cost elasticities would be the same
for all elds on the same row if all individuals were identical (no observed or unobserved
heterogeneity). This follows from the IIA property of the logit model, saying that identi-
cal pupils shift proportionally to other alternatives. We earlier found however that pupil
heterogeneity does matter in explaining educational choices. This is indeed reected in the
pattern of cross-cost elasticities, which vary widely within each row of the table. For exam-
ple, the last row shows that a rise in the costs of academic exact sciences would generate
much more substitution to other academic sciences than to vocational sciences; and among
the vocational sciences the gains would mainly go to the vocational exact sciences.
This example illustrates a more general pattern for the cross-cost elasticities: pupils tend
to mainly substitute within the academic or within the vocational program types, and to the
extent that they substitute across types they would especially choose the twin program eld
of the other type. There is thus generally a dominance of the program type dimension over
the program eld dimension. In a few cases this dominance is somewhat weak: vocational
exact sciences loose a comparatively high amount to academic sciences (fourth row), and
academic arts loose relatively much to vocational arts (fth row). In one case the dominance
of the program type over the program eld is actually reversed: vocational arts loose more
to academic arts than to any other vocational program (rst row). This is consistent with
the high quality reputation of the vocational arts programs relative to academic arts (e.g.
the language interpreter programs).
As a nal remark, note that exact sciences and biomedical sciences are the closest neigh-
bors, and so are social sciences and arts: in almost all cases, substitution mainly occurs
to these neighbors. The only exception occurs on the second and third columns, where it
appears that vocational biomedical and vocational social sciences are closest neighbors. This
can be explained by the nature of many of these vocational programs (e.g. nursing).
Concluding remarks
26The estimated elasticities show that uniform cost increases have little overall e¤ects on
the demand for hig her education,thoug h they can somewhat chang e the composition of
demand.I n contrast,cost increases b yp rog ram ty pe and p rog ram  eld lead to larg e shifts
in the composition. One may use these  nding s to draw some tentative conclusions on
policy reform.On the one hand,the low mark et- level elasticities sug g est that a uniform
tuition fee mayg enerate larg e distrib utional e¤ects,and comp arativelylower total welfare
imp rovements. On the other hand,the larg e elasticities at the level of the p rog ram ty pe
and p rog ram  eld,sug g est that di¤erentiated tuition fee increases mayinvolve additional
distrib utional and welfare e¤ects.To ob tain more insig hts,we turn to an illustrative welfare
analy sis nex t.
4.3 Implications for policy reform
To illustrate how our emp irical results can be useful in assessingpolicyreform,we focus on
the e¤ects of raisingtuition fees within a centraliz ed p ub lic sy stem,i. e.k eep ingother thing s
such as the q ualityand the diversityof sup p lyconstant.S uch an analy sis is hig hlyrelevant
since,as we have seen in section 2,fees are currentlyfar from su¢cient to cover even the
variab le cost per student,let alone the  x ed costs.An analy sis of more drastic reforms,such
as decentraliz ingdecision mak ingto the institutions,is bey ond the scope of this p aper,since
it would req uire a better emp irical understandingon how the institutions of hig her education
compete.
Framework
We mak e the followingassump tions.
 Pup ils can borrow at a competitive interest rate to  nance their educational ex penses.
This ensures that increases in tuition fees do not cause p up ils to dropout because of
cap ital constraints. Barr ( 20 0 4 )and others have discussed how this can be accom-
p lished throug h ap p rop riatelydesig ned income- conting ent student loans.
 Pup ils can deduct their educational ex penses from their ( future)tax ab le income.This
ensures that a p rog ressive income taxsy stem does not distort the incentives to invest
in hig her education;see Bovenbergand J acob s ( 20 0 5 )and J acob s and Vanderp loeg
( 20 0 5 ) . 26
26The result that educational ex penses should be tax deductable,or eq uivalently that the educational
subsidyrate should be eq ual to the marg inal income tax ,closelyrelates to Diamond and Mirlees( 1 9 7 1 )
result that the optimal taxrate on intermediate g oods is z ero.
27 The private (Mincer) returns to higher education are equal to the social returns, i.e.
there are no spillovers to others from investing in higher education. Based on a dis-
cussion of the available micro and macro empirical evidence, Jacobs and van der Ploeg
(2005) conclude that this is a realistic assumption. It allows us to directly use the esti-
mates of our random utility discrete choice model to compute the changes in consumer
surplus after a change in tuition fees.
 The government can regulate the colleges and universities, so that they do not change
the quality or diversity of supply in response to an increase in tuition fees. Variable
subsidies are granted on a cost basis. This allows us to treat the government and
the higher education institutions as an integrated entity, and use the governments
net revenues (tuition fee revenues minus the subsidy costs) as a measure of producer
surplus.
 Progressive income taxes ensure the socially desirable income distribution. Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) provide conditions under which this is the case. This allows us to
abstract from equity considerations.
Based on these assumptions we can assess the welfare e¤ects of tuition fee increases in
terms of consumer and producer surplus. Write the indirect utility V 
ij = Vij+(1 )l n (Kj),
where Vij is given by (4), as a function of the J  1 tuition fee vector t = (t1    tJ) , i.e.
V 
ij = V 
ij(t) for j 6= 0 . The nested logit model gives the following expression for pupil is









+ e x p(Vi0):
The average consumer surplus per pupil is CS =
PI
i=1 CS i=I, where I is the number of
pupils. The variable part of producer surplus per pupil (or governments variable net revenue)
for a specic study option j, as a function of t, is equal to
PS j(t) = (tj   cj)
X
i Pij(t);
where Pij(t) is the probability that individual i chooses program j as a function of t, and cj




Direct estimates of the variable cost per student cj are not available. As an indirect
measure we use the governments variable subsidy per student, since these are granted on
a cost basis as discussed in section 2. Table 2 summarized how the variable subsidies, and
28hence the estimated variable costs, tend to be higher for the biomedical and exact sciences,
especially at the universities. We will present the results from the estimated variable costs of
the second panel of Table 2, but the results are very similar when the alternative estimates
in the rst panel were used.
The most simple welfare analysis would simply look at the sum of consumer and producer
surplus. However, this would ignore that the social costs of public funds  may be greater
than zero, i.e. that the government may need to levy distortionary taxes elsewhere to nance
a higher education decit. Estimates of the social costs of public funds vary widely, from e
0.17 to over e 1.65 per euro of public funds raised as discussed in Bird (2005). Diewert,
Lawrence and Thompson (1998) suggest using a number of at least e 0.23 . We take a
conservative approach and compute total welfare as CS(t)+(1+)PS(t), where  is either
equal to 0, or equal to Diewert et al. s 0.23 .
Findings
Table 9 shows the e¤ects of both uniform and di¤erentiated tuition fee increases. The
rst two columns show the size of the considered fee increases. The next four columns show
the e¤ects on per pupil consumer surplus, net revenues and total welfare assuming the cost
of public funds  is either zero or e 0.23 . The nal two columns show the associated e¤ects
on participation.
The rst row shows the e¤ects of a  smalluniform tuition fee increase of e 1,000. This
is small in the sense that it is still insu¢cient to cover the variable costs per student (see
Table 2). Consumer surplus drops by e 657 per pupil.27 Producer surplus increases by an
amount of e 670 per pupil. Hence, there are large distributional e¤ects from students to the
government (tax payers). The total welfare increase depends on how one values the increase
in producer surplus: it increases by a small e 13per pupil if the social costs of public funds
are zero ( = 1), but by a much higher amount of e 167 if  = 0:2 3 .
The second row compares the e 1,000 uniform increase with a di¤erentiated fee increase
that yields an equivalent increase in producer surplus: we take a fee increase of e 750 at
colleges, which requires a fee increase of e 1,579 at universities to keep producer surplus
constant. This di¤erentiated fee increase implies that welfare increases by an additional e
12 per pupil relative to the uniform fee increase. This increase is due to a shift in demand
from the universities to the colleges, which operate at a lower variable cost (Table 2). This
shows that the earlier discussed diversion e¤ects to colleges are not necessarily bad from a
total welfare point of view. Nevertheless, it is also striking that di¤erentiating fees between
27This is roughly proportional to the fraction of eligible pupils that choose to study, as expected from a
discrete choice model.
29colleges and universities only improves total welfare by a small amount: we attribute this
to the fact that the shift to the colleges does not only imply a lower variable cost of supply,
but also a lower benet to the pupils.
To gain further insights we subsequently consider the e¤ects of more drastic cost-based fee
increases, i.e. fee increases that are su¢cient to exactly cover the variable part of producer
surplus. The third row of Table 9 considers the e¤ect of a uniform cost-based fee increase,
which amounts to a required fee increase by e 2,810. Since the variable costs per student
vary across program types and elds, such a fee increase implies some cross-subsidization
from colleges to universities, and from arts and social sciences to biomedical sciences and
exact sciences. By construction, (variable) producer surplus becomes zero, an increase by
e 1,852 per pupil relative to the status quo. There is therefore a large shift in distribution
from students to producers (the government). Total welfare increases by the small amount
of e 22 per pupil if  = 0, and by the much larger amount of e 448 if  = 0:23.
The fourth row shows how welfare further improves after a di¤erentiated cost-based fee
increase, i.e. such that the variable costs of each individual program are covered (implying
no longer a cross-subsidization). If  = 0, these tuition fees are also the rst-best levels.
Total welfare now increases by an additional e 100 relative to the uniform cost-based fee
increase. This shows that fee di¤erentiation has some modest e¤ect on total welfare, but the
e¤ect should not be exaggerated.
The nal row of Table 9 considers the welfare e¤ects of adding a uniform markup over the
cost-based levels. To illustrate, we consider a uniform markup of e 5,000, which is roughly
su¢cient to cover the xed costs of higher education (in addition to the variable costs). If
 = 0, such a uniform markup lowers welfare relative to the rst-best cost-based fees (by
about e 80 per pupil), but it still raises welfare relative to the status quo (by the small
amount of e 36 per pupil). In contrast, if  = 0:23 total welfare per pupil further increases
by e 1,150 relative to the status quo.28 Note that we also considered the welfare e¤ects
from introducing non-uniform markups over marginal costs (i.e. Ramsey pricing), to exploit
di¤erences in the elasticities; we found that the additional gains are negligible, which is due
to the fact that the estimated program-level cost elasticities are quite large and similar to
each other (see Table 8).
This discussion focused on the e¤ect of tuition fee increases on total welfare. To gain
additional intuition, the last two columns of Table 9 show how participation changes in
response to the tuition fee increases. Consistent with our earlier discussed cost elasticities,
28We also computed the optimal uniform markup under  = 0:2 3 . This amount to a markup over costs of
e 15,200. This very high number is due to the very low cost elasticity with respect to the overall participation
decision.
30overall participation generally does not drop by very much for the small fee increases (drop
by less than 1%) but also not for the more drastic cost-based fee increases (drop of slightly
more than 2%). Only if fees increase to have a e 5,000 markup, participation drops consider-
ably ( 7%). As a nal point, the di¤erentiated fee increases are accompanied by substantial
student shifts from the universities to the colleges. This again emphasizes that a diver-
sion of students from university to colleges is not necessarily harmful from a total welfare
perspective, due to the associated variable cost savings.
Concluding remarks
We can summarize this discussion as follows. First, uniform cost-based tuition fee in-
creases achieve most of the welfare gains; the additional gains from fee di¤erentiation are
relatively unimportant. The welfare increases are relatively large even under conservative
assumptions on the social cost of public funds. If one ignores the social cost of public funds,
the welfare gains are relatively small, but there is still a substantial redistribution from
students to outsiders.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the determinants of participation and schooling in a public system of
higher education, using a unique data set on pupils study choices. One of our central
ndings is that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs as close substitutes,
implying an ambiguous role for travel costs: they hardly a¤ect the participation decisions, but
have a strong impact on the schooling decisions. In addition, high school background plays
an important role in both participation and schooling. Our empirical analysis generalizes
previous work, which has focused on the participation rather than the schooling decision
(where and what to study). Based on information of travel costs, we can indirectly infer the
e¤ects from raising costs including tuition fees at a high level of detail.
Our empirical results can contribute to informing the debate on reforming public systems
of higher education. As an illustration, we have assessed the e¤ects of tuition fee increases.
Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains. The additional
gains from fee di¤erentiation are relatively unimportant. The welfare gains are quite large
if one makes conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds, and there is a
substantial redistribution from students to outsiders. Our empirical framework may be used
to assess the e¤ects of additional policy reforms of public systems. For example, in several
countries governments aim to rationalize the supply by reducing the number of institutions
through associations and/ or reducing the number of duplicated programs. In future research,
31it would be of strong interest to evaluate the e¢ciency and distributional e¤ects of these and
other, more drastic reforms, such as decentralizing decision-making to the universities and
colleges.
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7 Appendix. The data
We combine two main data sets: pupils and students. Both are made available by the
Flemish Ministry of Education. In addition to these data sets, we constructed a number of
auxiliary data sets, describing additional choice and/or demographic characteristics.
341. Pupils
The pupils data set contains information on all 55,905 pupils who attended the last
year of secondary school in the year 2001. For each pupil there is information on
ve variables, dening the pupils prole: secondary school institution, study program
during last year of secondary school, postal code, age (birth year), sex and nationality.
2. Students
The students data set contains information on all students who rst registered for a
higher education program in either 2001 or in 2002. Information is available on each
students prole, according to the same ve variables as in the pupils data set. In
addition, the data set contains each students choice of higher education institution,
campus and study program. Finally, there is information on the year of graduation
from secondary school. We use this last variable to extract the subset of students who
graduated from a secondary school in the year 2001. This amounts to a total number
of 35,562 rst registering students, out of which the large majority (34,395 students)
immediately registered after secondary school graduation in 2001, and a small group
registered with one year of delay in 2002 (1,167 students). Hence, it is reasonable
to assume that the fraction of 2001 pupils that rst registers to a higher education
institution after 2002 is negligible.
Our task is to distinguish between pupils who become students and pupils who remain
outsiders, i.e. who do not register at a higher education institution in 2001 or 2002. In
principle, this can be done by combining the pupils and the students data sets, based on
their proles as dened by the ve common variables: a pupil for which there is a successful
match with a student can be identied as a student, while a pupil for which there is no
successful match with a student can be identied as an outsider. In practice, we also found
a small number of students for which there is no successful match with a pupil. Based on
correspondence with the ministry of education, we attribute this to some inconsistencies in
the denition of the pupils proles rather than in the denition of the students proles. We
therefore adopt the following approach when matching the pupils and students data sets. We
identify as students all individuals in the students data set (even if no successful match with
a pupil was found). We then identify as outsiders all pupils for which there is no successful
match with a student. This will generate a data set with slightly too many individuals that
are identied as outsiders: this excess number is equal to the number of students for which
no successful match with a pupil was found. We then randomly drop this excess number of
individuals from the outsiders. Our combined data set then contains information on 55,905
pupils: 35,562 students and 20,343 outsiders.
35In addition to the two main data sets, we constructed a number of auxiliary data sets.
First, we have information on various characteristics of the secondary school institution and
the study program during the last year of high school. The information on the secondary
school institution includes the postal code of the secondary school and the network a¢liation
(free subsidized, o¢cial subsidized, or community). The information on the study program
during the last year of secondary school includes the main category (i.e. general, technical,
arts or professional high school program), as well as more specic information (focus on
languages, math, science, etc.). Second, we have information on the analogue characteristics
of the higher education institution and study program. Third, we have information on the
distribution of several demographic variables: average income by postal code, and average
commuting distance and commuting time of the active labor force by postal code. Fourth,
we make use of Microsofts route planning software to compute the distance and car travel
time between each individuals postal code address and each higher education institutions
postal code address. The distance and travel time between an individuals postal code and
the no-study alternative is set equal to the average distance travelled to work, by postal
code. Finally, we use information provided by the Belgian railroad company to compute
train travel times, i.e. train travel time between each individuals closest train station and
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Figure 1: Participation in higher education, by postal code
37Table 1: Supply of Higher Education in Flanders (2001)
Colleges Universities
(vocational education) (academic education)
Non-catholic Catholic Non-catholic Catholic
Number of campuses
Total 16 28 5 4
o¤ering degrees in
Arts 5 7 2 4
Social Sciences 12 21 3 4
Biomedical Sciences 10 17 5 2
Exact Sciences 14 15 5 2
Number of students
Total 9,899 15,283 6,658 5,641
enrolled for a degree in
Arts 1,016 791 943 933
Social Sciences 5,538 9,952 2,996 3,116
Biomedical Sciences 839 1,709 1,312 798
Exact Sciences 2,506 2,831 1,407 794
Note: Own calculations based on our dataset from the Flemish Ministry of Education.





Social Sciences 2,772 2,601
Biomedical Sciences 3,671 5,186




Social Sciences 2,865 2,807
Biomedical Sciences 3,683 5,000
Exact Sciences 3,448 5,290
Note: The top panel is based on the variable subsidy scheme for higher
education in vigour until 2001 (Universiteitendecreet, 1991; Hogesc-
holendecreet, 1994). The bottom panel is based on the proposed new
subsidy scheme (Vandenbroucke, 2005). We report student-weighted
averages of subsidies per study eld for both colleges and universities.
38Table 3: Summary statistics of 2001 eligible pupils
All
Pupils




male 0.48 0.45 0.56 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.43
foreign 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
catholic high school 0.75 0.78 0.70 0.79 0.76 0.67 0.87
Ability
years of repetition 0.61 0.36 1.11 0.46 0.16 0.40 0.34
(1.06) (0.95) (1.09) (0.99) (0.83) (1.05) (0.87)
general high school 0.48 0.60 0.21 0.44 0.94 0.63 0.58
classical languages 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.33 0.15 0.13
modern languages 0.19 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.24
economics 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.20
sciences 0.16 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.40 0.24 0.18
mathematics 0.23 0.30 0.09 0.15 0.60 0.34 0.27
technical high school 0.35 0.33 0.39 0.47 0.04 0.29 0.35
´ product - focused 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.12
Mobility
Distance (kms) by road to campus n/a 34.71 n/a 30.96 42.38 35.73 33.90
n/a (28.17) n/a (25.65) (31.37) (28.19) (28.13)
Time (mins) by road to campus n/a 30.74 n/a 28.33 35.67 32.13 29.64
n/a (17.33) n/a (16.2) (18.47) (17.59) (17.03)
Travel cost to campus (x10,000e) n/a 0.38 n/a 0.35 0.46 0.40 0.37
n/a (0.28) n/a (0.25) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28)
Time (mins) by train to campus n/a 47.60 n/a 44.33 54.30 47.62 47.59
n/a (28.04) n/a (26.19) (30.41) (27.83) (28.20)
Number of observations 55,905 37,481 18,424 25,182 12,299 16,557 20,924
Note: Standard errors for the continuous variables are in parentheses. Demographic and ability data are based on
our data set from the Flemish Ministry of Education; mobility statistics are based on own calculations using postal
code information.
39Table 4: Participation and schooling decisions - Comparison of alternative models
Aggregate logit Aggregate nested Disaggregate nested
model logit model logit model
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Outside option (
0)
intercept 4.10* (26.52) 1.51* (12.39) 1.18* (14.60)
male 0.22* (3.85) 0.27* (5.61) 0.31* (7.55)
foreign 1.17* (6.23) 1.00* (6.15) 0.77* (6.59)
catholic high school 0.20* (3.28) -0.33* (-6.20) -0.35* (-7.90)
years of repetition 0.47* (13.04) 0.45* (15.57) 0.47* (20.61)
general high school1 -1.81* (-13.70) -2.19* (-20.44) -2.14* (-21.00)
classical languages 0.82* (6.21) -0.34* (-3.01) -0.14 (-1.55)
modern languages 0.03 (0.24) 0.10 (1.02) 0.05 (0.63)
economics -0.36* (-2.94) -0.17 (-1.62) 0.08 (0.89)
sciences 0.29 (2.46) -0.07 (-0.67) 0.02 (0.17)
mathematics 0.34* (3.08) -0.08 (-0.80) 0.00 (-0.05)
technical high school1 -1.73* (-17.41) -1.38* (-18.55) -1.19* (-16.88)
´product-focused 0.57* (6.37) 0.21* (2.94) 0.24* (3.85)
Travel cost (i)
intercept 5.44* (18.14) 6.34* (19.44) 6.46* (17.84)
' -0.41* (-2.20) -0.42* (-2.09) -0.49* (-2.12)
male -0.10 (-0.86) -0.06 (-0.53) 0.24 (1.83)
foreign -0.63 (-1.24) -0.22 (-0.38) 0.63 (1.30)
catholic high school -0.30* (-2.13) -0.62* (-3.96) -0.45* (-2.68)
years of repetition -0.01 (-0.18) 0.04 (0.49) 0.07 (0.74)
general high school1 0.28 (1.02) 0.06 (0.21) -0.36 (-1.09)
classical languages -0.58* (-2.93) -0.75* (-3.59) -0.53* (-2.36)
modern languages -0.01 (-0.07) 0.07 (0.33) 0.42 (1.89)
economics 0.29 (1.38) 0.25 (1.11) 0.50* (2.06)
sciences -0.57* (-2.89) -0.62* (-2.96) 0.01 (0.06)
mathematics -0.20 (-1.06) -0.17 (-0.84) -0.17 (-0.77)
technical high school1 1.42* (6.13) 1.67* (6.58) 1.41* (4.80)
´product-focused -1.05* (-5.50) -1.30* (-6.32) -1.41* (-6.33)
Nesting parameters
 0 (not estimated) 0.898* (33.90) 0.946* (42.80)
 -0.048* (2.01) 0.888* (30.42) 0.950* (46.60)
Slope parameters (
j, j 6= 0)
Catholic Institution2 included included included,see table 5
Academic program3 included included included,see table 5
Vocational long program3 not included not included included,see table 5
Study eld characteristics4 not included not included included,see table 5
Fixed e¤ects (j) included included included,see table 5
Observations 778,464 778,464 2,981,735
indiv iduals 1 4 , 4 1 6 1 4 , 4 1 6 1 9 , 2 3 7
alternativ es 5 4 5 4 1 5 5
Mean log likelihood -0.0383068 -0.037747 -0.0032785
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *statistical signicance at 5% level
1 base category = professional/arts high school
2 base category = non-catholic study option
3 base category = vocational study option (aggregate models), vocational short study option (disaggregate model)
4 base category = arts study option







j; j 6= 0) Catholic Vocational
long
Academic Social Biomedical Exact
intercept -0.74* -0.52* -2.99* -1.70* -3.12* -2.33*
(-4.48) (-2.12) (-9.88) (-6.13) (-8.55) (-8.59)
male -0.03 0.52* 0.23* 0.31* -0.62* 1.43*
(-0.49) (6.38) (3.12) (3.29) (-5.41) (13.85)
foreign -0.16 0.50 1.07* 0.03 0.08 -0.40
(-0.67) (1.41) (3.44) (0.08) (0.17) (-0.95)
catholic high school 1.05* 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.20 0.33*
(15.27) (1.79) (1.49) (0.64) (1.36) (2.53)
years of repetition -0.10* -0.28* -0.22* -0.02 -0.14 -0.14
(-2.50) (-4.30) (-3.68) (-0.25) (-1.56) (-1.79)
general high school4 0.10 0.23 2.71* 2.40* 2.65* 0.71*
(0.78) (0.96) (10.16) (9.64) (7.86) (2.67)
classical languages 0.08 0.92* 1.88* -0.52* -0.48* -0.81*
(0.88) (5.82) (14.83) (-3.83) (-2.92) (-5.12)
modern languages -0.08 0.41* -0.03 -0.53* -0.73** -0.65*
(-0.94) (3.03) (-0.32) (-4.08) (-4.43) (-4.07)
economics 0.11 0.84* 0.11 1.35* 0.67* 0.43*
(1.19) (5.85) (0.96) (8.90) (3.48) (2.36)
sciences -0.06 0.89* 1.01* 0.57* 1.73* 1.39*
(-0.67) (6.34) (8.80) (3.98) (10.37) (8.87)
mathematics -0.19* 1.60* 1.37* 0.91* 1.22* 1.98*
(-2.13) (12.09) (12.81) (7.02) (7.53) (12.61)
technical high school4 -0.14 -0.42 0.32 2.86* 3.45* 1.12*
(-1.23) (-1.87) (1.17) (10.84) (10.13) (4.26)
product-focused -0.11 0.81* -0.17 -0.09 1.31* 2.94*
(-1.19) (5.26) (-0.91) (-0.34) (4.66) (10.77)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * statistical signicance at 5% level
1 base category = non-catholic study option
2 base category = vocational short study option
3 base category = arts study option
4 base category = professional/arts high school




Logit -16.43 -0.91 -13.79
(0.29) (0.24) (0.25)
Aggregate nested -1.95 -0.87 -1.62
(0.51) (0.23) (0.43)
Disaggregate nested -1.09 -0.51 -0.91
(0.45) (0.21) (0.38)
Pupils by prole (disaggregated nested logit model only)
male -1.28 -0.60 -1.07
female -0.94 -0.44 -0.78
Belgian -1.08 -0.50 -0.90
foreign -2.11 -1.24 -1.80
no repetition -0.78 -0.44 -0.65
1 year repetition -1.51 -0.91 -1.41
2 years repetition -2.20 -1.54 -2.14
catholic high school -1.00 -0.47 -0.83
non-catholic high school -1.49 -0.74 -1.29
general high school -0.54 -0.46 -0.50
technical high school -1.36 -1.33 -1.35
professional/ arts high school -2.58 -2.54 -2.58
Current market share 45.05 22.00 67.04
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
1Reported as semi-elasticities: % change in market share given a uniform
cost increase of e 1,000.
Table 7: Cost elasticities at program type level
E¤ect on1:
Colleges Universities Overall
Increase for colleges -12.88 26.30 -0.72
(0.44) (0.54) (0.30)
Increase for universities 10.61 -24.03 -0.13
(0.21) (0.40) (0.06)
Current market share 45.53 20.47 66.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
1 Reported as semi-elasticities: % change in market share given a cost increase
of e 1,000.
42Table 8: Cost elasticities at study eld level
E¤ect on1:
Vocational study elds Academic study elds
Arts Social Biomedical Exact Arts Social Biomedical Exact
Increase for:
Vocational * Arts -43.03 2.87 1.99 2.08 4.09 2.48 1.74 1.43
Vocational * Social Science 28.34 -26.60 37.89 18.69 15.84 17.86 10.55 8.57
Vocational * Biomedical Science 2.36 4.15 -45.53 3.31 1.87 2.07 2.87 1.89
Vocational * Exact Science 5.40 5.43 8.03 -33.46 2.00 3.09 3.29 7.41
Academic * Arts 3.79 1.55 1.43 0.72 -39.17 4.26 3.29 2.19
Academic * Social Science 5.90 4.38 4.09 2.92 10.91 -38.28 10.76 9.78
Academic * Biomedical Science 1.72 1.13 2.42 1.29 3.52 4.51 -38.49 5.25
Academic * Exact Science 2.08 1.41 2.33 4.10 3.50 6.12 7.80 -36.44
Current market share 3.73 28.33 4.46 9.02 3.35 8.35 3.61 5.17
1 Reported as semi-elasticities: % change in market share given a cost increase of e 1,000.
Table 9: Welfare e¤ects of tuition fee increases










Uniform small increase + e1,000 + e1,000 -657.0 670.1 13.1 167.2 -1.09 -0.51 -0.91
Di¤erentiated small increase + e750 + e1,579 -645.1 670.1 25.0 179.2 8.04 -20.46 -0.80
Uniform cost-based increase + e2,810 + e2,810 -1,830.8 1,852.3 21.6 447.6 -3.08 -1.46 -2.58
Di¤erentiated increase to variable cost tj = cj tj = cj -1,736.8 1,851.8 115.1 541.0 3.32 -14.98 -2.35
Uniform big increase cj + e5,000 cj + e5,000 -4,881.7 4,918.2 36.5 1,167.7 -2.49 -17.31 -7.09
1 The changes are in e/pupil and relative to the status quo.
2 Reported as semi-elasticities: % change in market share given a cost increase of e 1,000.
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